11 July Protests in Cuba: A Personal Narrative of EventsHelen Yaffe
Abstract: On Sunday July 11 anti-government protests took place simultaneously in towns and cities throughout Cuba; the first violent protests there for 27 years. The international media depicted mass opposition to the Cuban government, police repression of peaceful protests and a regime in crisis. Cuban 猫咪社区app leaders and 猫咪社区app politicians called for 猫咪社区app intervention, while President Biden labeled Cuba a 鈥渇ailed state鈥. The Cuban government and its supporters pointed to media manipulation, called out hypocrisy, emphasized the context of economic hardship caused by increased 猫咪社区app sanctions compounded by the global pandemic, and implicated 猫咪社区app-funded regime change programs, including a social media war on Cuba. This chapter gives a personal account of what happened on July 11 and the following week, juxtaposing external commentary and internal response. It points out that battle lines are being drawn and more conflict is inevitable.
__________
On Sunday 11 July, anti-government protests, apparently coordinated via social media, took place simultaneously in towns and cities throughout Cuba. In several places, including San Antonio de los Ba帽os on the outskirts of Havana, and in Matanzas, where COVID-19 cases had been surging, protests turned violent, with windows smashed, shops looted, cars overturned, rocks thrown, and people assaulted. These were the first violent protests in Cuba since the maleconazo of 1994, 27 years ago. The international media depicted mass opposition to the Cuban government, police repression of peaceful protests and a regime in crisis. Cuban 猫咪社区app leaders and 猫咪社区app politicians, called for 猫咪社区app intervention, while 猫咪社区app President Joseph Biden labelled Cuba as a 鈥渇ailed state鈥. The Cuban government and its supporters pointed to media manipulation, called out hypocrisy, emphasized the context of economic hardship caused by increased 猫咪社区app sanctions compounded by the global pandemic, and implicated 猫咪社区app-funded regime change programs, including a social media war on Cuba.
Commentators are unlikely to agree on how to narrate the events of 11 July in Cuba; some will depict the protests as a 鈥渃ause鈥, others as an 鈥渆ffect鈥; some will consider them 鈥渟urprising鈥, others 鈥渋nevitable鈥; some will describe them as 鈥渋nternal and spontaneous鈥, others as 鈥渆xternally orchestrated鈥; some will portray them as peaceful, others as violent. Facts do not speak for themselves; they take place within a context and are filtered and ranked by the analyst. I happened to be in Cuba on that day, and this is an account of events as I understand them.
Sunday 11 July
Between 10-11am on 11 July, in the church park in San Antonio de los Ba帽os, a town on the outskirts of Havana, residents answering a post on Facebook gathered ostensibly to protest recent electricity blackouts and, while they were at it, to demand regime change. The Facebook administrator鈥檚 post mentioned the lack of electricity, but his pre-prepared slogans for the protest were overtly political, or anti-communist, rather than expressing practical demands.[i] Using the pseudonym Danilo Roque with the decapitated head of the Cuban President as his profile picture, the Facebook administrator had called for Cubans to take to the streets several times since 2019, to no avail. 鈥楾hen the situation worsened with COVID-19 and the lack of medicines鈥, he told a journalist for El Estornudo website. 鈥楢nd so we were waiting for the opportune occasion for the people to come out to express their feelings鈥. Occurring during summer and the COVID-19 surge, the electricity blackouts created that 鈥榦pportune occasion鈥, said Roque. 鈥楳y team and I decided that this was the moment to strike, given that the government was concentrating on COVID-19鈥.[ii]
They marched through the neighborhood, attempting to enter the local police station, before returning to the park, and soon stones and bottles were thrown. Streamed live on social media, the protest was amplified by members of the external and domestic opposition, including Luis Manuel Otero Alc谩ntara of the San Isidro Movement, who urged the population to take to the streets across the island.[iii] Within the hour thousands of Cubans had heeded that call. In some places, protestors looted shops, walking off with washing machines, mattresses, and bottles of rum. Cars were over-turned, and fights broke out with citizens or police who confronted the protestors. Footage from Havana shows youths striding through the streets clutching rocks or throwing them at police patrol cars. In some places, Cuban 鈥榖lack berets鈥, special forces or plain clothes state security agents poured onto the streets and arrests were made. In others places few police were seen and the protests did not turn violent. In C谩rdenas, a town in Matanzas province near the resort city of Varadero, stones were thrown at the Julio Aristegui Villamil children鈥檚 hospital, terrifying infant COVID-19 patients, their parents, and medical staff.[iv]
While these mobilizations appeared to be spontaneous, Peruvian media analyst Jota, points to evidence of pre-planning and coordination. Placards displayed the logo of the organization 鈥淐uba Decide鈥, an exile organization set up in Miami in 2015, and the same political slogans echoed from one place to the next. Claiming to have 鈥渟crupulously鈥 analyzed the footage available, Jota states that protests of 100 to 500 people took place in 12 towns and cities. He also claimed that the twitter accounts of Rosa Mar铆a Pay谩 and the Fundaci贸n para la Democracia Panamericana, which are linked to Cuba Decide, had published edited graphic material about the protests 鈥渇lyers, videographics, denunciations about detentions鈥 since 9am. that same day.[v]
Cuban President Miguel D铆az-Canel responded to events on Sunday 11 July like Fidel Castro during the maleconazo in 1994. He arrived at San Antonio de los Ba帽os shortly after 2pm. Footage shows him speaking to local people and the press, and leading a march through the streets, accompanied by members of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party (CCP) and local CCP leaders and residents. He acknowledged their frustrations, with the electricity blackouts, medicine shortages and surging COVID-19 cases. The temporary electricity blackout was due to repairs being carried out on generators, he explained, adding that the issues were linked as the need to prioritize the electrical and medical supply to the new centers, which had been opened due to the increase in COVID-19 patients, had exacerbated the scarcity experienced by the general population.
In the midst of this situation, he stated, the 鈥淐uban Mafia鈥 had paid YouTubers and social media influencers to create a campaign, using as a pretext the situation in Cuba, particularly in Matanzas, to call for demonstrations throughout the country. He talked about people being confused and manipulated by social media, 鈥測ou know that social media works with emotions and people have limits, we understand, and they are living with scarcity.鈥 There are even confused revolutionaries, he said, who went out to express their dissatisfaction. 鈥淏ut there is also a group of people, counterrevolutionaries, mercenaries, paid by the 猫咪社区app government, or indirectly paid through 猫咪社区app government agencies to set up this type of demonstration.鈥 The streets belong to the revolutionaries, he asserted to applause, warning 鈥gusanos鈥 and mercenaries that if they broke the law they would be dealt with. 鈥淚 put myself first among the many here willing to give our lives for the revolution.鈥 We can improve things in Cuba, he said, but we need the 猫咪社区app blockade to be lifted.[vi]
At 4pm. D铆az-Canel appeared on state television to inform the public about the protests, echoing the points made in San Antonio earlier, concluding with the similar declaration: 鈥淲e are calling on all the revolutionaries in the country, all the communists, to take to the streets in any of the places where these provocations are going to take place. Today, from now, and in all these days, to confront it decisively, firmly, with courage鈥 the order to combat is given, revolutionaries to the streets.鈥[vii] Some Cubans had already gathered outside places of work and education after seeing reports of the protests on social media. Following D铆az-Canel鈥檚 televised speech, thousands of Cubans took to the streets in towns and cities around the country in support of the government and Cuban socialism. According to Cuban reports, prior to D铆az-Canel鈥檚 live broadcast, 19 state-owned shops and establishments had been attacked; during the half hour of his televised speech another 10 were ransacked and after 4.30pm., 15 more shops were vandalized.[viii] Most of those shops were in Matanzas.
The anti-government protests had ended within hours and the streets were back under control of the authorities and government supporters. Internet access via mobile phone data was suspended, presumably to prevent social media being used to coordinate more protests.
Monday 12 July
On Monday 12 July, there was a tense calm, with life continuing as normal. Cubans gathered outside some workplaces, like the Cuban Institute of Radio and Television on La Rampa (Calle 23) in Havana, ready to defend them in case of attack. Travelling across Havana on public transport and in taxis, I heard car radios and saw workplace televisions tuned into a live four-hour broadcast by the President, government Ministers and CCP leaders who discussed the events of the previous day, the shortages and the obstacles each ministry faced in the context of the pandemic and suffocating sanctions, and denounced 猫咪社区app intervention.
The Cuban Minister of Energy and Mines explained the causes of the electricity blackouts suffered in San Antonio over the previous days. D铆az-Canel, an electrical engineering graduate, added context explaining how 猫咪社区app sanctions, particularly the imposition of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, had generated economic difficulties and fuel shortages.[ix] Cuba鈥檚 national electrical system operates with different technologies, or generators, which require different types of fuel, he said, but delays in obtaining specific fuels led to overloading other generators. There were also problems with getting spare parts for repairs, and with the finances to purchase them, both a result of the intensification of financial persecution through sanctions introduced under the Trump administration. Again, he explained how the need to prioritize the electrical supply to hospitals under strain from the COVID-19 pandemic and patient isolation centers put additional stress of Cuba鈥檚 generation capacity.
Another violent protest took place in Arroyo Naranjo, another town on the outskirts of Havana, in which one person died, and others sustained injuries, including police. It was reported on state news.[x] Small skirmishes took place over the following days. Police began arresting people at their homes who had been identified as participating. Given the abundance of film footage posted on social media by participants, it cannot have been difficult to identify them.聽
Many Cubans began to download and connect to the internet using a VPN (Virtual Private Network) called Psiphon, described by Bloomberg as an 鈥渁nti-censorship tool supported by the 猫咪社区app government to evade blackouts of social media such as Facebook鈥.[xi] Psiphon is funded by the 猫咪社区app Agency for Global Media鈥檚 Open Technology Fund and in 2010 began providing services to the 猫咪社区app鈥匘epartment鈥卭f鈥匰tate, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the 猫咪社区app Broadcasting鈥匓oard鈥卭f鈥匞overnors, a 猫咪社区app government agency which manages Radio Mart铆 and Television Mart铆, which were set up to broadcast propaganda to Cuba in violation of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) regulations.
Tuesday 13 July
At an international press conference on Tuesday 13 July, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodr铆guez presented evidence of a new media campaign financed from the United States to foster internal opposition. His accusations included the following: On 15 June, the hashtag #SOSCuba was launched by a 猫咪社区app company the same day it was authorized to receive Florida state funding. On 5 July, hashtags appeared calling for a 鈥榟umanitarian corridor鈥 or 鈥榟umanitarian intervention鈥 in Cuba. Bots and troll farms were used to disseminate messages on Twitter through false accounts, including one doing five retweets per second on 10 and 11 July. Twitter users had changed their geolocation to appear to be in Cuba.[xii] Similar evidence had been highlighted the previous day by Spanish analyst Juli谩n Mac铆as Tovar who, as Ed Agustin reported for The Guardian, 鈥渇ound that the #SOSCuba campaign had been driven by accounts linked to Atlas Network, a free-market consortium of more than 500 organizations that have received funding from ExxonMobil and the Koch brothers. Twitter accounts of Atlas Network members have been involved in bot or troll center campaigns in recent elections in Peru and Ecuador, as well as the 2019 civic-military coup in Bolivia.鈥[xiii] Mac铆as Tovar also revealed that the first twitter account to use the hashtag #SOSCuba in relation to the COVID-19 surge in Matanzas had a Spanish flag in its biography. The number of tweets using that hashtag peaked for two days before the 11 July protest and 鈥渙ne of the main accounts was that of Antonneti from the Fundaci贸n Libertad de Argentina.鈥[xiv]
Wednesday 14 July
Internet access improved beginning on Wednesday 14 July. The worried messages I received from people outside Cuba and the foreign media reports that I could now read indicated the extraordinary misreporting underway about the extent and significance of the protests. This was so blatant that even Reuters published a 鈥渇act check鈥 article to correct reports circulating the image of the 2018 May Day parade, with hundreds of thousands pouring into Revolution Square in Havana, mislabeled as the anti-government protests from 3 days earlier.[xv] Numerous mainstream outlets, including the New York Times and El Pa铆s published photos of government supporters in the streets, describing them as opposition activists.[xvi] Photos of protests in Egypt, sports celebrations in Argentina, looting in South Africa, and police repression of Catalan activists were all presented as showing the Cuban protests of 11 July.
In an interview with Fox News, the Mayor of Miami, Francis Su谩rez, called for the option of airstrikes against Cuba to be 鈥渆xplored鈥, citing 猫咪社区app military intervention in Panama and Kosovo, and the assassination of Osama Bin Laden in sovereign Pakistan as relevant precedents. Footage played during the interview, showed Cubans marching in support of the revolution in the background, with the July 26th Movement flags of supporters of the Revolution and the messages on their placards blurred out, suggesting intent.[xvii] 猫咪社区app Senator Ted Cruz was interviewed with the same footage behind.[xviii]
On social media there were accusations of mass disappearances, systemic torture and even missing children. Photos of unnamed victims were presented, which were then identified by social media analysts as originating in other countries. The hundreds arrested and detained were reported as 鈥渄isappeared鈥. The Cuban news did not cover up these accusations but aired them and sought to expose them as lies during dedicated television programs.聽
Friday 16 July
猫咪社区app Senator Marsha Blackburn (Republican-Tennessee), tweeted: 鈥淥ver 1.3 million Cubans have been able to access the internet today thanks to @PsiphonInc, an open-source tool supported by the bipartisan Open Technology Fund my colleagues and I championed. We must stand with those opposing authoritarian regimes.鈥[xix] According to Psiphon, the number of daily unique users in Cuba was negligible on 10 July, rising exponentially to 1.3 million by 15 July.[xx]
That same day, a tweet by UN Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, called on the Cuban government to release detainees, used the image of a black woman holding a Cuban flag and shouting in the street. The woman featured, Betty Pairol Quesada, responded angrily on Twitter: 鈥淚 strongly denounce the use and manipulation of my image as a symbol of the protests by delinquents and vandals in Cuba. We are continuity, long live the Revolution. #NoMoreBlockadeofCuba.鈥[xxi] Twitter swiftly blocked her account.[xxii]
That evening, Cuban TV presented a video widely circulated on social media apparently showing a Cuban police officer shooting a man at his home, with the camera pausing on a pool of blood on the floor. The presenter showed alternative footage of the man walking calmly to the police car in handcuffs following his arrest and of him being interviewed at his home, in good health, three days later.[xxiii] Every day there were also special news programs about the protests and the arrests and detentions, including the legal process which police must follow.
At the end of the evening news, it was announced that there would be rally on the Malec贸n in the morning, in support of the government and the socialist Revolution. This was the first mass rally called amidst the strict epidemiological restrictions imposed 16 months earlier.[xxiv] The rally would be restricted to under 200,000, the news announcer said.
Saturday 17 July
Before dawn thousands of Cubans were already gathering at La Piragua on the Malec贸n. We joined the rally, interviewing diverse participants on camera and asking why they were there. The resounding response was to demand an end to the 猫咪社区app blockade and 猫咪社区app interference. It was a short event, addressed by D铆az-Canel, who denounced a false narrative, which blamed the violence of the previous Sunday on his call for revolutionaries to take to the streets. Cuban internet news outlets had been subject to 鈥渄enial of service鈥 attacks aimed to silence Cuba鈥檚 ability to counter the opposition narrative, he said.[xxv] Gerardo Hern谩ndez of the Cuban Five, now President of the Committees in Defense of the Cuban Revolution also spoke. Former President Ra煤l Castro was present, along with other ministers. Spirits were high and while the event was serious, it also ended jubilantly with music and Cubans dancing in the road.[xxvi]
The following week/s鈥
The Cuban government and state media continued to address the accusations of disappearances and other issues related to the protests. For example, a television discussion on 21 July, explained the legal framework under which detentions took place, including the obligation to inform detainees麓 families within 24-hours. An Interior Ministry official, Victor 脕lvarez, said 鈥淭hese lists [of disappeared] are a fallacy of the Revolution's enemies... we have proved that many of these people are not currently detained鈥. The Head of the Department of Penal Processes, Jos茅 Luis Reyes, claimed that since 12 July, 63 people had requested information about a detained person or had made a complaint about a detention. Among this list of 鈥渟upposedly disappeared people鈥, he added, 鈥渢here is a group that has been released, some of them received fines and others have received a caution.鈥[xxvii]
On 22 July, President Biden reneged on his electoral campaign promises to unwind Trump policy on Cuba, announcing that his administration would use the Magnitsky Act to impose new sanctions on Cuban individuals, starting with 脕lvaro L贸pez Miera, the head of Cuba鈥檚 Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Cuban Ministry of the Interior鈥檚 Special National Brigade. He also announced a plan to roll out 猫咪社区app-controlled internet access to Cubans, which would be outside of Cuban government control.[xxviii]
The Cuban government and the CCP have categorized the protestors into four groups: 鈥渃ounter-revolutionaries鈥 paid and operating under 猫咪社区app regime change programs; criminals who took advantage of the situation to loot; people genuinely frustrated by daily hardships; and young people who feel disenfranchised.[xxix] It is the latter two groups that state institutions are now focusing their political work on. D铆az-Canel and Gerardo Hern谩ndez, with others, have visited poorer communities, including those where violent protests took place, dialoguing with residents. They aim to reinvigorate the social and political organizations at the neighborhood level.聽
Resurrecting a program of the Battle of Ideas of the early 2000s, on 26 July 2021, the Union of Young Communists launched new Youth Brigades of Social Work, 鈥済roups of prevention and social attention at the Popular Council level鈥. On 5 August they began to visit homes in the 302 poorer neighborhoods identified to find out about the problems those communities face.[xxx] Within five weeks of the protests, 3,400 university students, young teachers and other professionals had joined these brigades.[xxxi] The CCP was also working to strengthen its institutional presence and influence at the level of the Popular Councils.
Meanwhile, the Facebook page for residents of San Antonio joined calls for a national mobilization to take place on November 20. The Cuban government announced its annual national defense military exercises for three days (November 18-20). In response the opposition brought forward their day of action to November 15. On October 12 Cuban authorities denied permission for the proposed marches, stating that some of the organizers who 鈥渉ave ties to subversive organizations or agencies financed by the United States government, have manifest intentions of promoting a change in the political system of Cuba鈥.[xxxii] The battle lines are being drawn and more conflict is inevitable.
Notes
[i] Instructions were: 鈥El clamor va a ser lo siguiente: -V谩yanse del gobierno, -Libertad para el pueblo, -D铆az-Canel sing鈥, -Somos m谩s y no tenemos miedo, -Queremos ayuda.鈥 Carla Gloria 颁辞濒辞尘茅, 鈥11 de julio en San Antonio de los Ba帽os: Lo que se ve/lo que no se ve鈥, 22 July 2021. https://revistaelestornudo.com/san-antonio-de-los-banos-protestas-11-julio-cuba/
[ii] 颁辞濒辞尘茅, 11 de julio en San Antonio.
[iii] 鈥楨l artista y ex preso pol铆tico Luis Manuel Otero Alc谩ntara llam贸 a manifestarse contra la dictadura castrista: 鈥淢e voy al Malec贸n cueste lo que me cueste鈥濃, Infobae, 11 July 2021. https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2021/07/11/el-artista-y-ex-preso-politico-luis-manuel-otero-alcantara-llamo-a-manifestarse-contra-la-dictadura-castrista-me-voy-al-malecon-cueste-lo-que-me-cueste/
[iv] CubaSi, 鈥楨n Video: Detalles sobre el ataque al hospital territorial Julio Aristegui Villamil el 11 de julio鈥, 16 Julio 2021. https://cubasi.cu/es/noticia/en-video-detalles-sobre-el-ataque-al-hospital-territorial-julio-aristegui-villamil-el-11-de.
[v] Prensa Alternativa - El Jota, 鈥樎oderosa ONG est谩 implicada en las movilizaciones en Cuba!鈥 YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tiiuzF6MazM
[vi] Canal Caribe, 鈥楶residente de Cuba recorri贸 San Antonio de los Ba帽os鈥 12 July 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_-qd6XkgIKg
[vii] Radio Cubana, 鈥業ntervenci贸n 铆ntegra del Presidente de #Cuba Miguel D铆az-Canel este 11 de Julio鈥, 12 July 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZnGMSGSVnOk
[viii] Canal Caribe, 鈥樎縌u茅 hay detr谩s de los actos violentos en Cuba el 11 de julio?鈥, 17 July 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdWWDbxwbj8
[ix] CiberCuba, 鈥楨N DIRECTO: Miguel D铆az-Canel habla al pueblo de Cuba tras una jornada de protestas鈥, 12 July 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zcge7dVTlDo
[x] Nota Informativa del Ministerio del Interior de Cuba, 14 Julio. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a6LLivUYHB0
[xi] Brody Fort, 鈥極ver 1 Million Cubans Evade Internet Curbs With U.S.-Backed Tech鈥, Bloomberg, 16 July 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-16/over-1-million-cubans-evade-internet-curbs-with-u-s-backed-tech
[xii] 鈥楨n vivo: Canciller cubano, Bruno Rodr铆guez, ofrece Conferencia de Prensa (+Video)鈥, Granma, 13 July 2021. www.granma.cu/mundo/2021-07-13/en-vivo-canciller-cubano-bruno-rodriguez-ofrece-conferencia-de-prensa-13-07-2021-15-07-58
[xiii] Ed Agustin, 鈥榃hy the internet in Cuba has become a 猫咪社区app political hot potato鈥, 3 August 2021, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/03/why-the-internet-in-cuba-has-become-a-us-political-hot-potato
[xiv] Juli谩n Mac铆as Tovar, Twitter. https://twitter.com/JulianMaciasT/status/1414681690434412548 and https://twitter.com/JulianMaciasT/status/1414681695207440388
[xv] Reuters Fact Check, 鈥楩act Check-Photo shows聽2018 Cuba聽May Day聽march, not聽2021 protests鈥, 14 July 2021,
https://www.reuters.com/article/factcheck-cuba-protest-id猫咪社区appL1N2OQ2DI. The article itself exposed misreporting in a Reuters tweet which labelled photos of Cubans holding a portrait of Fidel Castro as 鈥榓nti-government demonstrations鈥.
[xvi] Pascual Serrano provides many examples of false reporting and manipulative use of photos, 鈥楲a democracia es desinformar sobre Cuba鈥, El Diario, 19 July 2021. https://www.eldiario.es/opinion/zona-critica/democracia-desinformar-cuba_129_8149927.html
[xvii] Gustaf Kilander, 鈥楳iami mayor calls on Biden to consider airstrikes against Cuba鈥, Independent, 14 July 2021. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/cuba-protests-airstrikes-miami-mayor-b1884238.html
[xviii]Alan MacLeod, Twitter. https://twitter.com/AlanRMacLeod/status/1416713677378629636
[xix] Marsha Blackburn, Twitter. https://twitter.com/MarshaBlackburn/status/1416059430748237824
[xx] Psiphon Inc., Twitter. https://twitter.com/psiphoninc/status/1416069807301185537
[xxi] Betty Pairol, Twitter. https://twitter.com/BettyPairol/status/1416157403184340992
[xxii] Pairol鈥檚 twitter account remained 鈥榯emporarily restricted鈥 on 4 October 2021 when last checked. She recorded a similar message via Facebook, denouncing the media manipulation of her photo and demanding the 猫咪社区app government end the 猫咪社区app blockade. Betty Pairol, Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/betty.pairolquesada/videos/507947167155070
[xxiii] Cubadebate, 鈥楧esmintiendo fake news y campa帽a medi谩tica en redes sociales contra Cuba鈥, 17 July. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zz3ItstwX_o. Cuban news had already discussed this video on Wednesday 15 July.
[xxiv] From April to June 2021, mobilizations took place on the last Sunday of the month as part of the international 鈥榗aravanas鈥 against the 猫咪社区app blockade of Cuba, with people in cars, on motorbikes, bicycles, on foot or sitting outdoors with social distancing.
[xxv] Oscar Figueredo Reinaldo and Abel Padr贸n Padilla, 鈥楶ueblo habanero toma La Piragua en defensa de la Revoluci贸n y el socialismo鈥, 17 July 2021. www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2021/07/17/pueblo-habanero-toma-la-piragua-en-defensa-de-la-revolucion/
[xxvi] Helen Yaffe, Twitter. https://twitter.com/HelenYaffe/status/1416394130465427458 and https://twitter.com/HelenYaffe/status/1416394288011821060
[xxvii] CubaSi, 鈥楨N VIDEO: 驴Desaparecidos en Cuba o fantasmas de las fake news?鈥, 21 July 2021. https://cubasi.cu/es/noticia/en-video-desaparecidos-en-cuba-o-fantasmas-de-las-fake-news. On 4 August, 62 people had been tried in municipal courts following arrests related to 11 July; 53 of them for public disorder and the rest for resistance, contempt, and instigation to commit a crime and cause harm, which carry sentences from a 300 peso fine and one year in prison. One was acquitted and 45 were appealing. The cases of those accused of more violent or serious crimes were still under investigation. Oscar Figueredo Reinaldo, 鈥楢s铆 marchan las investigaciones penales tras los sucesos del 11 de julio en Cuba鈥, 4 August 2021, CubaDebate. http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2021/08/04/asi-marchan-las-investigaciones-penales-tras-los-sucesos-del-11-de-julio-en-cuba/.
[xxviii] Marc Caputo and Sabrina Rodr铆guez, 鈥楤iden sanctions Cuban regime after crackdown on protesters鈥, Politico, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/22/biden-sanctions-cuba-500534
[xxix] Andrea Rodr铆guez, 鈥楥uban government rallies backers following big protests鈥, AP News, 17 July 2021. https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-business-health-cuba-caribbean-9ed6c6dd50ddb764a482099e44cdc25c
[xxx] 鈥楥onstituyen Brigadas Juveniles de Trabajo Social para laborar en 302 comunidades vulnerables鈥, CubaDebate, 1 August 2021. http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2021/08/01/constituyen-brigadas-juveniles-de-trabajo-social-para-laborar-en-302-comunidades-vulnerables/
[xxxi] For a full account of the Battle of Ideas see chapter 3, Helen Yaffe, We Are Cuba! How a Revolutionary People Have Survived in a Post-Soviet World, Yale University Press, 2020.
[xxxii] See the reply by Alexis Acosta Silva, Intendente of the Administrative Council of la Habana Vieja on October 12, 2021, 鈥淩espuesta al documento presentado sobre la decisi贸n de realizar una marcha con fines desestabilizadores鈥